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Abstract
Vertical integration is an important business strategy among firms in the U.S. food industries.  Our objective is to
test one of the perceived benefits of vertical integration – improved profitability of the integrated firm.  Findings
show that increased vertical mergers in food industries would lower profits.
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1. Introduction
With increased trade liberalization, rapidly changing consumer demand and a regulatory environment, the need for
a more closely coordinated marketing system is becoming increasingly more important.  Such increased
coordination allows firms along the marketing chain to be more responsive to the changing market environments. 
The constant pressure to meet customer demands and the need to be competitive while staying profitable have
provided added motivation to search for a more closely coordinated marketing system for most products today. 
Rooted in the concept of supply chain management, vertical integration is championed as the solution to such
coordination problems.  Essentially, there are two types of vertical integration: contract integration and ownership
integration (or vertical mergers).  Contract integration exists when a firm establishes a legal commitment that
binds the producer to certain production and marketing practices.  Contract integration requires that the producer
(e.g., a farmer) sell the product to the integrated firm (e.g., a food manufacturer).  Vertical merger exists when
single ownership extends to two or more levels of the marketing system.  A manufacturer selling its products
through its own retailing outlet or a distributor of electricity owning its own power generating plants are examples
of vertical mergers. 
It is commonly argued that increased vertical integration has resulted in improved, consistently high
quality, uniform products for consumers.  It is also argued that increased vertical integration has resulted in
lowering prices by both the unmerged input supplier and the vertically integrated firm (McAfee, 1999). 
Theoretical literature has shown that under certain conditions, vertical integration will increase economic
efficiency in terms of output and price and also increase profit for the integrated firm, i.e., a win-win situation
(Greenhut and Ohta, 1979).  More generally, this strand of literature contends that vertical integration or
coordination will create efficiencies by reducing the transaction costs associated with the market exchange
(Williamson, 1974 and later years; Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 1978; Perry, 1989).  Other most commonly
argued benefits of vertical integration include the reduction of risk (Buzzell, 1983; Porter, 1985), the ability (of
integrated firms) to innovate and to differentiate (Porter, Perry), increased efficiency in the exchange of
information and organizational structures (Porter), and improved market positions of the integrated firm (Perry).  
Although there are many expected benefits of vertical integration, the existing empirical literature seems
to have focused mostly on issues related to transaction cost, foreclosures, and the determinants of vertical
integration (e.g., Monteverde and Teece, 1982; MacDonald, 1985; Anderson and Coughlan, 1987; Caves and-2-
Bradburd, 1988; Rosengren and Meehan, 1994; Davies and Morris, 1995; Waterman and Weiss, 1996).  The
empirical literature on an important aspect of vertical integration, i.e., its effect on price, output and profit, is
surprisingly limited.  Among the existing studies, McBride (1983) found that vertical integration negatively
impacted post-integration prices.  Findings by Ghemawat and Caves (1986) show that vertical integration may
have created exit barriers for the integrated firm and may have a harmful price-increasing effect.  Martin’s study
(1986) shows that vertical integration’s effect on profitability is ambiguous.  Simply put, the empirical literature has
largely failed to provide evidence on the effect of vertical integration on price, output and profit (Suominen, 1992).
Azzzam and Pagoulatos (1999) conclude that there are serious gaps in the vertical integration literature and the
limited empirical work that has been done in this area makes generalization difficult to achieve.  The main purpose
of this study, thus, is to empirically examine the effect of vertical integration on the integrated firm’s profitability. 
More specifically, we examine the impact of vertical mergers, i.e., vertical ownership integration, on the
profitability of U.S. food manufacturers/processors.  
Vertical integration, in one form or another, is an integral part of both the agricultural and food
manufacturing sectors in the United States.  As the U.S. food system has become more and more consumer
driven, the importance of vertical integration has also become more important because it allows both farmers and
food processors to manage and customize their production according to market needs.  The poultry industry has
been largely integrated since the early 1960s, while vertical integration has been spreading rapidly since early
1980s into other food industries.  Most conspicuous among these are the meat packing and the prepared meat
(including pork) industries, processed dairy industries, processed fruits and vegetables industries, bread and
bakeries industries, etc.  For instance, the meat packing and prepared meat industries not only are dominated by a
very few large processors (e.g., ConAgra), but also purchases on the open market in these industries are replaced
by vertical integration of some type.  In 1998, approximately 40 percent of hog sales to packers were coordinated
by contracts and integrated operations compared with 11 percent in 1993 and only three percent in 1980
(Martinez, 1999).  Such emerging trends are likely to affect the structural linkages connecting the production
agriculture and the food manufacturing industries.    
Although the economic concerns regarding the impact of continued industrialization and vertical
integration in the U.S. agricultural and food manufacturing sectors have been growing, we are surprised to find
that in agricultural economics literature, the Frank (1990) and Frank and Henderson (1992) studies were the only
studies to make any attempt to empirically measure the degree of vertical integration in the U.S. food
manufacturing industries.  Unlike the Frank and Henderson’s study, other existing studies of vertical integration in
the U.S. food industries are mostly descriptive and focus on issues such as the motivation behind vertical
integration, efficiencies of alternative vertical structures, i.e., contractual vs. ownership integration, or the impact-3-
of vertical integration in terms of farm-retail price spreads (e.g., Kinnucan and Nelson, 1993; Azzam, 1996;
Martinez).  
In Frank and Henderson’s last sentence, they wished for more knowledge on how vertical coordination
hampers or enhances profitability and economic welfare.  That statement sums up the principal objective of this
study and its contribution to the literature.  Since vertical integration may have both costly and beneficial impacts
on competition or market performance, depending on the kind of vertical relationship, we limit our focus to
ownership integration, i.e., vertical mergers, only.  Thus, we empirically examine how ownership integration
impacts profitability in the U.S. food industries.  With that general objective in mind, we break down this paper
into two specific objectives: to empirically measure the degree of vertical integration in the U.S. food
manufacturing industries, and to analyze the impact of vertical integration on the profitability of these industries. 
The next section describes how to measure vertical mergers and industry profitability, followed by the
development of a model to examine the impact of vertical integration on profitability in Section 3.  Section 4
describes the data.  Results are presented and discussed in Section 5, followed by conclusions in Section 6.
2. Measurement of Vertical Mergers and Profitability 
2.1 Measuring Vertical Mergers
While the debate over the impact of vertical integration continues, the literature on empirical measurement of
vertical integration is limited in general.  This, according to Hay and Morris (1991, p. 345), is mainly because
“difficulties of measurement are no doubt one reason for the lack of systematic study of vertical integration.” 
Similarly, according to Caves and Bradburd (p. 265) “... devising measures of vertical integration that are
meaningful and comparable among industries has proved difficult.”  Such measuring difficulties obviously pose
serious problems in attempts to analyze the impact of vertical mergers in the U.S. food industries (or in any other
markets).  Adelman’s (1955) value added to sales ratio is considered the seminal work on empirical measurement
of vertical integration and is one of the most widely used measures of vertical integration.  This type of
measurement, however, was unable to distinguish whether the integration was intra-industry or inter-industry
(Davies and Morris).  Similarly, vertical integration measurements based on census data on establishments (e.g.,
Tucker and Wilder, 1977) or enterprises (e.g., Levy, 1985) either only measures vertical integration taking place
within the plant or enterprise, or are sensitive to multiplant backward integration by the firm (Caves and
Bradburd).  
More recent attempts at measuring vertical ownership integration rely on national input-output (I-O)
tables, a trend started by Maddigan (1981) with her “vertical industry connection index” for a given firm. -4-
Maddigan’s index was based on the extent of technological relatedness, as revealed by I-O tables, among the set
of industries within which the firm operates.  Davies and Morris argue that her index ignores the magnitude of the
firm’s operations in those industries, e.g., an orange juice manufacturer with some form of vertical backward
integration into production of oranges (say, either ownership or contract of orange orchards) would record the
same value, whether its orange producers supply 1 percent or 100 percent of its fresh orange needs.  
As mentioned earlier, among agricultural economics literature, only Frank and Frank and Henderson
provide an empirical measurement of vertical integration in the U.S. food manufacturing industries.  In addition to
creating an inter-industry index of vertical coordination (they use the term ‘vertical coordination’ to incorporate
both ownership and contract integrations), another objective of both of these studies was examining the effect of
transaction costs on U.S. food manufacturing industries’ vertical integration.  However, Frank and Henderson’s
index of vertical integration was similar to Maddigan’s and thus, suffered from similar shortcomings, i.e., sensitive
to the stage in the vertical chain at which the firm operates.  In addition, their vertical coordination index ignored
intra-firm vertical linkages.
The vertical merger index presented here is based on the methodologies proposed by Caves and Bradburd
and Davies and Morris.  The index is based on the simple notion that integration is revealed by larger internal
flows of output (within the firm) at the expense of market transactions.  MacDonald is largely credited for
successfully implementing this notion in terms of the proportions of shipments from manufacturing industries that
are made to affiliated units (which may include manufacturing establishments, sales offices, wholesale, and retail
establishments).  Using national I-O tables and other public domain data (explained later), we construct a forward
vertical merger index where a food manufacturing firm in industry   is the integrated firm owning its own
wholesale and/or retail outlets as well as owning food manufacturing firms in another food manufacturing
industry  ( ).  Such measurement reflects integration between business units in a given industry and those in
industries downstream from it, thereby offering the potential for testing the impact of such integration on the
performance of markets in which these integrated firms exist.  Note that such a measurement will miss any
integrated enterprises that operate in vertically-related industries but do not actually transfer intermediate products
between their units (Caves and Bradburd).  
The index of vertical mergers presented and used in this study shares properties with both Caves and
Bradburd and Davies and Morris measures, albeit with modifications.  Adopting these measures to create a
forward vertical mergers index is an attempt to avoid the shortcomings of both MacDonald and Maddigan’s
measures and Frank’s measures.  Consequently, some of the features of the vertical integration index presented
here are as follows: (i) it is based on the explicit theoretical notion of what constitutes vertical integration and
shows whether the index measures inter- or intra-industry integration, (ii) this index can be mechanically estimated-5-
(1)
from easily available public domain data and does not require any subjective assessment of firm or industry
definition, and (iii) although we present only the analysis at the industry level, this index can be estimated at both
firm and industry levels.
2.2 A working definition
The Coase-Williamson paradigm of theoretical vertical integration literature dictates that the essence of vertical
integration is the decision by the individual firm on whether to organize exchanges internally (within the firm) or
externally (in the marketplace).  According to Davies and Morris, any sensible measure of vertical mergers, thus,
should reflect the magnitude of intra-firm flows of output relative to external sales.  However, it is difficult, if not
impossible, to obtain information on the internal and market exchange of firms (Perry).  Therefore, we present a
theoretically cruder, but more practical working definition of a vertical merger index.  This working definition
takes both intra-firm and inter-industry flows into consideration.
In an industry comprised of    firms and   industries, a  forward vertical merger of industry   is
measured by the proportion of industry sales accounted for by the intra-firm flows of output from firms in the
industry to their plants in other industries, i.e., 
where   is the index of forward vertical integration of industry  ,     is the “sales or destination coefficient”
or the fraction of   ‘s output sold to its own  firm in industry  , i.e.,  , where   is the flow of
output within firm   from its plants in industry   to its plants in industry  , and   is the total sales of industry  . 
The intra-firm flows between industry  and    are weighted by the proportion of   ‘s firms in industry   , or
, where    is the number of companies active in both   and   , and     is the total number of
companies active in  .  If there are no intra-firm flows between industry   and    , then   indicating a
lack of vertical integration.  Thus, the value of the forward vertical integration will lie between [0,1] or
.  The data necessary to estimate equation (1) is described in Section 4.
The emphasis of the vertical merger measure on the proportion of firms integrated is responsive to the
transaction-cost model, which focuses on the firm’s decisions to integrate.  This measure, however, does not
represent intra-firm and/or inter-industry flows that are not integration related, e.g., administrative transfer
between industries.  While we acknowledge the limitations set by the high level of aggregation in I-O tables (or
even in other census data), this type of aggregation problem is common to the measurement of integration.  -6-
(2)
2.3 Measuring Food Industry Profitability 
It is much easier to define profit than to measure it empirically.  Economic profit simply means the surplus of
revenue over cost, including the opportunity cost of capital.  The perils of measuring economic profit have been
discussed in depth in Scherer and Ross (Ch. 11, 1990).  While the use of some form of rate of return (e.g., return
on equity or Tobin’s q ratio) is common in the financial literature, such profitability measures have a serious
drawback.  They usually reflect the operations of whole companies/corporations and the user must somehow
mesh the company-specific profit data with industry-specific structural variables (Scherer and Ross, p. 418). 
Another source of profitability data is the Internal Revenue Service’s Statistics of Income: Corporation Income
Tax Returns.  Because large companies are usually very diversified and the IRS uses the primary industry
method to classify companies, vast amounts of “contaminating” activity are loaded into the primary industry totals
along with correctly classified primary industry profits, sales, and assets (Scherer and Ross, p. 418).  
This type of contamination problem is greatly reduced in the U.S. Census Bureau’s Census of
Manufacturers and Annual Survey of Manufacturers (Scherer and Ross, p. 418).  From the data available in
these two publications, it is possible to compute an industry average price-cost margin, i.e.,
, to represent a measure of net industry profitability. 
Although this profit rate index is a weak measure of industry profitability, it is the closest approximation to industry
profitability given the drawbacks of other measures.  Despite the controversy regarding the use of such a price-
cost margin index to measure market power, here we use this index as a measure of profitability, not market
power. 
Using the industry profitability measure of Domowitz, Hubbard, and Peterson (1986), we define net
industry profitability as follows: where   is net industry profit,   is dollar sales,   is the change in inventories,
 and   are  the cost of labor and materials, and   is the imputed cost of capital.
3. Impact of Vertical Integration on Industry Profitability
Ideally we would like to employ a research procedure that extracts vertical integration as one of the explanatory
variables from the profit maximizing conditions of firms in an industry.  However, we share the judgement of other
researchers that this approach is a dead end in deriving such a relationship.  From a more practical view point, we
model the impact of vertical integration on industry profitability using a structure-performance paradigm mirroring-7-
widely acceptable models.  Using some form of price-cost margin index, economists since Bain have been trying
to identify the factors or variables that influence economic performance and examine the links between these
factors and market performance.  These studies have been severely criticized in the literature which is a subject
matter beyond the scope of this paper, for using price-cost margin to represent market power instead of what it
actually represents, i.e., industry profits.  Although our model mirrors these studies, we are examining the effect
of vertical mergers on industry profitability, not market power, as well as the direction and magnitude such
effects. 
We present an industry-level empirical model of profitability in which industry profitability,  , is the
dependent variable.  Among the explanatory variables, our target is the vertical mergers variable ( ) and how
it impacts   while controlling for various industry characteristics (e.g., productivity, competition) that mirrors
those used in the previous studies.  From earlier discussions, we have learned that vertical integration or vertical
mergers impact industry profitability.  If vertical integration contributes to the creation of differential advantage or
efficiency (e.g., cost savings due to integration) to enhance the profitability of the integrated firm, then we would
expect a positive and significant impact of vertical mergers on industry profitability.  To control for efficiency
across sample industries, we use a relative productivity index defined as value added per worker ( ).  If
increased profitability is due to efficiency, whether due to vertical mergers or otherwise, we would expect   to
have a positive and significant impact on industry profitability.  
We expect the four-firm market concentration ( ) to have a positive and significant impact on industry
profitability, indicating the ability of a few firms in highly concentrated industries to influence the terms of trade,
i.e., price, and increase profits.  National concentration ratios may understate actual concentration when markets
are regional or local, e.g., ice cream and frozen desserts (SIC 2024), fluid milk (SIC 2026), bread and bakery (SIC
2051), etc.  We use a regional industry dummy variable ( , where   =1 for industries that are regional in
nature) to control for this understatement, and we expect a positive sign.
Those industries with barriers to entry, even for the short-run, will enjoy higher profits than those without
such barriers.  To represent the difference across industries in entry conditions, we include an index of product
differentiation in terms of advertising intensity ( ) defined as advertising-to-sales ratio, research and
development intensity ( ) defined as research and development expenditure to sales ratio, and capital intensity
defined as capital-to-sales ratio ( ).  While both   and    may help create entry barriers which will
help sustain profitability (i.e., positive and significant relationships with  ), there is no a priori belief on the
innovation and invention index,  , because of its paradoxical impact on market performance.  
To control for differences across industries in demand conditions we use the domestic demand or
absorption rate as one of the explanatory variables.  This domestic demand rate (DOMDEM) is defined as-8-
(3)
follows:   .  We expect DOMDEM to have a positive and
significant impact on industry profitability.  Although we have included imports in the DOMDEM variable, we
wanted to isolate the effect of import competition on domestic producers’ profitability.  Therefore, we introduce
an import competition variable defined as the import-to-sales ratio ( ) as one of the explanatory variables. 
While high domestic demand may have a positive and significant impact on profitability, we expect a negative and
significant impact of competition from foreign firms on the profitability of domestic firms.  Esposito and Esposito
(1971) used a similar reasoning to examine the impact of import competition on market performance.
Based on our discussion above, our main hypothesis takes the following estimable form,
where   is an error term.
4. The Data 
We focus our study on the U.S. food manufacturing industries at the 4-digit SIC (standard industrial classification)
level.  All data used in this study are obtained from public domain sources.  We use data on “Distribution of Sales
by Class of Customer” (published every 10 years) from 1987 Census of Manufacturers: Subject Series, from
which one could calculate the proportions of each industry’s sales destined for affiliated units of its constituent
firms, i.e.  the “sales or destination coefficient” in equation (1).  For example, in 1987 shipments to other
establishments of the same company for the meat packing plants (SIC 2011) included $3,130.5 million or 7.5934
percent to wholesale establishments (including sales offices), $145 million or 0.3517 percent to retail stores and
outlets, $1414.3 million or 3.4305 percent to other manufacturing establishments, and $113.5 million or 0.2753
percent to other nonmanufacturing establishments.  That is, the destination coefficient for SIC 2011 is 0.1165. 
Similar computations were carried out for the other industries with data adjusted for 1992. 
Data needed to compute the industry profitability index, i.e., equation (2), were obtained from the 1992
Census of Manufacturers: Industry Series.  Nominal capital stock data available at the National Bureau of
Economic Research’s (NBER) productivity data base (www.nber.org) was used to compute the cost of capital
for the sample industries, assuming a 4 percent depreciation rate.  The most time consuming computation involved
determining the proportion of   ‘s firms in industry   , or   , in equation (1).  The accuracy of the value of 
is obviously limited by the accuracy of our data source, the Ward’s Business Directory of U.S. Private and
Public Companies (Gale Group, 2000).  Taking errors of commission and omission together, we believe that the-9-
numerator of   is understated while the denominator may be either over- or understated.  Based on available
data, we were not able to compute   for the following industries: SIC 2043, 2062, 2068, 2076, 2085, and 2097. 
These six industries were dropped from further analysis.  Thus, the sample contained 43 food manufacturing
industries (table 1).
Explanatory variables in equation (3) were constructed using 1992 Census of Manufacturers data on
industry concentration ( ) and value added per production employee ( ).  Capital stock data from NBER
was used to construct  .  Trade (import and export) data needed to compute the domestic absorption or
demand variable ( ) and the import competition variable ( ) were obtained from the NBER
trade data bank (April 2000) and verified with trade data available (now discontinued) from U.S. foreign trade
highlights publications courtesy of International Trade Administration, Department of Commerce (April 2000). 
Data on both    and   were provided by Professor Rigoberto Lopez of the University of Connecticut
(adjusted to 1992).  Appendix tables 1 and 2 show descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix of variables in
equation (3).
5. Results and Discussions
5.1 Food Manufacturer’s Vertical Integration
In the case of forward vertical mergers, the  index (column 4, table 1) shows the proportion of industry sales
accounted for by the intra-firm flows of output from firms in the industry to their plants in other industries,
including wholesaling, retailing, manufacturing, and nonmanufacturing industries.  That is, as shown in equation (1),
we were able to compute a reliable index of ownership integration of an industry ( ) because the   index
included sales of industry  ‘s output sold to its own  firm in the industry   ( ).  Results in Table 1 show that
among the 43 sample industries, forward vertical ownership integration was the highest (0.1138) in the soft drinks
industry (SIC 2086) and the lowest (0.0015) in the flour and other grain mill products (SIC 2041) in 1992.  This
means that the soft drinks industry was 11.38 percent integrated upstream, or that the soft drinks industry owned
11.38 percent of its upstream markets.  On average, the degree of forward vertical ownership integration in the
U.S. food industry was 0.0331 or 3.31 percent.  Given a possible maximum of 1.00 (or 100 percent), results in
Table 1 show that the degree of forward vertical mergers in individual food industries, as well as in the sector in
general, was quite low. 
>>>> table 1 about here>>>>>
Comparing these findings to those of Frank and Henderson, we note several key differences.  One is that1  Beta coefficients show which variables contribute most to the regression by taking into account the
effect of a typical or "equally likely" change in variables.  The beta coefficients were calculated by multiplying the
estimated coefficients by the standard deviation of each regressor and dividing by the standard deviation of the
dependent variable. 
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Frank and Henderson’s definition of vertical relationship (they used the term “vertical coordination” or VC) was
broader in scope as they included several vertical governance structures, including ownership integration.  A
major difference between their study and this study is that the former defined the food manufacturing industries as
the upstream industries from the U.S. farm sector, e.g., Frank and Henderson’s VC index values ranged from
zero for industries that procure virtually no input from the U.S. farms (e.g., coffee roasters) to nearly one for the
industries which had high incidence of production management contracts (e.g., poultry slaughtering and
processing).  Their VC index captured all types of vertical relationships while this study only captures vertical
ownership integration or vertical mergers.  Other key differences include the use of different computational
procedures (e.g., Frank and Henderson relied on a Maddigan-type index, which we avoided here due to reasons
discussed elsewhere) and the use of different kinds of data.  For example, while Frank and Henderson relied on
1982 Input-Output data, we use industry sales data, which clearly identify the proportion of each industry’s sales
destined for its own companies in other industries.  Moreover, the principal goal of the Frank and Henderson study
was to examine the effect of transaction costs on vertical coordination in the U.S. food manufacturing industries,
while the main objective here is to examine the impact of forward vertical ownership integration on industry
profitability.  The bottom line is, while this study and Frank’s study may share some common ideas, the two
studies are clearly different in their objectives, procedures, and contribution to the literature. 
5.2 Impact of Vertical Mergers on Industry Profitability
Using equation (3) we examined the impact of vertical mergers on industry profitability using 43 U.S. food
manufacturing industries as our sample.  Descriptive statistics of the regression variables in equation (3) are
presented in appendix table 1, while a correlation matrix of these variables is presented in appendix table 2.  The
correlation matrix shows that the industry profitability index is negatively correlated with the vertical merger index
and the regional concentration dummy, and positively correlated with the rest of the explanatory variables.  The
correlation matrix also fails to show any serious multicollinearity problem among the explanatory variables.  Only
the advertising intensity and relative productivity variables show a higher level of positive correlation (0.726).  The
estimated model (equation 3) is corrected for heteroskedasticity by using prescribed procedures in SHAZAM.
>>> table 2 about here>>>>>
Regression results are presented in Table 2.  Beta-coefficients 
1 were computed for each explanatory2  Removing either of these two variables from the estimated model did not have much effect on either the
estimated coefficients or the goodness-of-fit statistic.  However, when both of these variables were removed from
the estimated model, the goodness-of-fit statistics decreased to 0.491 while the direction and the magnitudes of the
estimated coefficients did not change much.  Given such an outcome, we decided to keep both of these variables in
the reported model.  We also tested an alternative model with a variable representing interaction between market
concentration (CR4) and vertical mergers (FVI) to examine their joint impact on industry profitability. However, this
interactive term was statistically not significant and therefore, was not included in the final model.
-11-
variable to determine their relative contributions in explaining profitability in the U.S. food industries.  Although this
study used cross-sectional data, the model performed very well given the relatively high value of the squared
correlation coefficient between the observed and the predicted values.  The most striking feature of the results in
Table 2 is that the arguments put forward in the construction of the market performance model, i.e., equation (3),
were well substantiated.  Results show that six out of eight variables (excluding the regional market concentration
variable (REG) and the import competition variable (IMPORT)) were statistically significant and almost all of
them kept their expected signs. 
2
In terms of the effects of the market structure variables on U.S. food industry’s profitability, it was found
that vertical mergers (integration) had adversely impacted the profitability of the sample industries.  More
specifically, a unit increase in vertical mergers decreased the profitability of the sample industries by almost the
same magnitude.  We argued earlier that in order to have a positive and significant impact on profitability, vertical
mergers must contribute to the creation of differential advantage or efficiency to the integrated firm.  Given our
results, it can be argued that forward vertical mergers failed to create or contribute to the creation of differential
advantage or efficiency of the integrated firms in U.S. food manufacturing industries.  In addition, our results also
imply that although the current level of vertical integration in the U.S. food manufacturing industries may be low,
any further increase in such activities would lead to a further decline in net profitability of this sector.
As predicted, market concentration (CR4) positively and significantly increased profitability of the sample
industries.  A positive and significant productivity index (RP) signals an increase in profitability due to an increase
in productivity, i.e., increased performance.  Although this finding supports the well-known Demsetz hypothesis,
note that increased productivity may have created some kind of entry barriers, thereby allowing existing firms to
reap higher profits.  Table 2 shows that innovations and inventions in the form of higher research and development
(RnD) will improve industry profitability.  Results in Table 2 shows that those industries with high advertising
intensity (ADVT) would have a higher profit rate.  Although advertising potentially has salutary (e.g., raising 
consumer awareness) and detrimental effects (e.g., creating entry barriers), high profitability is more likely to
arise from creation and maintenance of brand loyalty among consumers and thereby shut off potential entrants
into the market.   
The capital intensity (KINT) variable was negative and significant indicating that capital intensive-12-
industries were more likely to incur loss than those that are not capital intensive.  This finding rejects the idea that
highly capital intensive industries are more profitable because such industries create entry barriers by requiring
higher capital for entry.  Our results also show that higher domestic absorption or demand (DOMDEM) would
significantly increase industry profitability.  This finding, along with that of the positive and significant impact of
advertising on profitability, shows the importance of marketing strategies that aim at expanding domestic
consumer demand.  Although import competition (IMPORT) did not have any statistically significant impact on
food industry profitability, the estimated coefficient shows the expected negative sign, i.e., import competition
adversely affects the profitability of domestic firms.  
Finally, beta coefficients (table 2) show that domestic demand, advertising intensity, and investment in
innovation and inventions were the three most important variables in explaining profitability in the U.S. food
manufacturing sector.  Overall, the results presented in this study accord reasonably well with previous inter-
industry studies on industry profitability, and the results support the model presented in equation (3).
6. Conclusions
Most of the existing studies on vertical integration focus on transaction-cost issues or foreclosure issues and avoid
an important question: How does vertical integration affect profitability?  We empirically examine that question in
this study using 43 U.S. food manufacturing industries.  We computed a vertical ownership integration, or vertical
merger index, that captures both intra-firm and inter-industry forward ownership integration linkages for each of
the sample industries.  In general, we found that although a lot of merger activities have been going on in this
sector since the early 1980s, the level of forward vertical mergers that currently exists was very low (less than 4
percent).  However, we acknowledged data limitations in our study and how it may have led to underestimation of
the vertical merger index.  
Our main objective was to examine the impact of vertical mergers on profitability.  Our results show that
increased vertical mergers in the U.S. food manufacturing industries would lead to a lowering of profits.  This is
perhaps due to the failure of vertical mergers (integration) to create differential advantages, such as cost savings,
for the integrated firm.  This finding may attract more attention from food industry executives than from the U.S.
anti-trust authorities, who generally do not pay attention to vertical mergers unless foreclosure becomes an issue.  
In addition, the results of this study accord reasonably well with previous inter-industry research on
industry profitability.  For example, this study shows that increased market concentration significantly increases
profitability.  A similar assessment was made regarding higher domestic demand and increased advertising
intensity.  Additionally, those industries that invest in research and development and have a more productive labor
force would also increase their profit significantly.  Results show that increasing capital intensity as a strategy to-13-
increase profit would have the opposite effect on profitability.  Contrary to popular belief, the argument that
capital intensive industries create entry barriers leading to higher profits was not supported by the findings. 
Although import competition had a negative impact on the profitability of domestic firms, such an effect was
statistically insignificant. 
Although there was a lack of clear linkages between the theoretical model of industry profitability and
vertical integration, we followed a more practical approach commonly suggested in the literature and were able to
provide an improved measure of vertical integration.  However, there is a need for theoretical work regarding the
linkage between various types of vertical integration and profitability.  The future research agenda should include
improving the index of vertical integration.  Finally, we acknowledge that data inconvenience imposed some
limitations in this study, as it did on all previous studies of this kind.  To rectify this continued data problem, we
recommend expanding the scope of data collected by government agencies. -14-
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Table 1.  Profitability and the Degree of Vertical Integration in the U.S. Food Manufacturing Industries, 1992 (N=43)
SIC
code
Industry Description Profitability Index Forward Vertical
Integration Index ( )
2011 Meat packing plants 0.0885 0.0159
2013 Sausages and other prepared meats 0.1731 0.0413
2015 Poultry slaughtering and processing 0.1496 0.0487
2021 Creamery butter  0.1016 0.1126
2022 Cheese, natural and processed 0.1953 0.0119
2023 Dry, condensed, and evaporated dairy products 0.3878 0.0104
2024 Ice cream and frozen desserts 0.2901 0.0519
2026 Fluid milk 0.1875 0.0878
2032 Canned Specialty 0.4580 0.0131
2033 Canned fruits and Vegetables 0.3638 0.0273
2034 Dehydrated Fruits, vegetables and soups 0.4178 0.0566
2035 Pickles, sauces and salad dressing 0.5023 0.0095
2037 Frozen fruits and vegetables 0.2636 0.0193
2038 Frozen specialties, n.e.c. 0.3930 0.0207
2041 Flour and other grain mill products 0.1925 0.0015
2044 Rice milling 0.2068 0.0253
2045 Prepared flour mixes and doughs 0.3596 0.0048
2046 Wet corn milling 0.4084 0.0075
2047 Dog and cat food 0.4656 0.0192
2048 Prepared feeds, n.e.c. 0.1387 0.0423
2051 Bread, cake, and related products 0.4070 0.0341
2052 Cookies and crackers 0.4913 0.0055
2053 Frozen bakery products, except bread 0.3770 0.0238
2061 Raw cane sugar 0.2629 0.0310
2063 Beet sugar 0.2528 0.0954
2064 Candy and other confectionary products and industry 0.4379 0.0134
2067 Chewing gum 0.3701 0.0068
2066 Chocolate and cocoa products 0.1533 0.0228
2074 Cottonseed oil mills 0.2179 0.0238
2075 Soybean oil mills 0.0981 0.0633
2077 Animal and marine fats and oils 0.2867 0.0134
2079 Edible fats and oils, n.e.c. 0.2328 0.0500
2082 Malt beverages 0.4960 0.0158
2083 Malt 0.2267 0.0234
2084 Wines, brandy, and brandy spirits 0.3859 0.0227
2086 Bottled and canned soft drinks 0.2913 0.1138
2087 Flavoring extracts and syrups, n.e.c. 0.7128 0.0431
2091 Canned and cured fish and seafoods 0.2357 0.0425
2092 Fresh or frozen prepared fish 0.2232 0.0089
2095 Roasted coffee 0.4547 0.0777
2096 Potato chips and similar snacks 0.4204 0.0234
2098 Macaroni and spaghetti 0.4914 0.0133
2099 Food preparations, n.e.c.  0.3668 0.0259-18-
Industry Average 0.3171 0.0331
Maximum 0.7128 0.1138
Minimum 0.0885 0.0015
Standard deviation 0.1372 0.0284




























































Squared corr. coef. between
observed and predicted
0.548
Note: (i) standard errors in parenthesis, (ii) beta coefficients are in absolute terms, (iii) model
was corrected for heteroskedasticity, (iv) *** = 99% level of confidence, ** = 95% level of
confidence, and * = 10% level of confidence.-19-
Appendix table 1: Descriptive statistics of model variables
Variable N Mean St. Dev. Variance Minimum Maximum
PCM 43 0.3171 0.1372 0.0188 0.0885 0.7128
FVI 43 0.0331 0.0284 0.0008 0.0015 0.1138
CR4 43 47.9530 17.9340 321.6200 19.0000 90.0000
REG 43 0.3023 0.4647 0.2160 0.0000 1.0000
RP 43 0.1992 0.1527 0.0233 0.0385 0.9086
RND 43 0.3143 0.1828 0.0334 0.0001 0.7283
ADVT 43 0.0258 0.0183 0.0003 0.0035 0.1076
KINT 43 0.0148 0.0069 0.0000 0.0045 0.0329
DOMDEM 43 0.9931 0.0401 0.0016 0.9096 1.0455
IMPORT 43 0.0463 0.0255 0.0007 0.0130 0.0835
Appendix table 2: Correlation matrix of model variables (N=43)
PCM  1.0000
FVI -0.2684 1.0000
CR4 0.3891 -0.0944 1.0000
REG -0.1064 -0.0598 -0.2097 1.0000
RP 0.6037 0.0536 0.4755 -0.2766 1.0000
RND 0.5600 -0.0432 0.3026 -0.2463 0.5418 1.0000
ADVT 0.6203 -0.1183 0.3058 -0.2520 0.7263 0.4092 1.0000
KINT 0.0794 0.1198 0.3490 -0.0407 0.0099 0.0088 -0.0608 1.0000-20-
DOMDEM 0.4031 0.1146 0.1333 -0.1426 0.1624 0.2344 0.3027 0.0699 1.0000
IMPORT 0.1659 0.0669 0.2899 -0.0389 0.1000 0.0027 0.1559 0.2972 0.4135 1.0000
PCM  FVI CR4 REG RP RND ADVT KINT DOMDEM IMPORT